Misinformation1 makes up only a small fraction of shared and consumed news online2,
while being concentrated in politically extreme communities (Allen et al., 2020; Baribi-Bartov et al., 2024; González-Bailón et al., 2024)
\(\rightarrow\) how harmful is misinformation on social media then?
1=false information without intention to deceive (Wardle & Derakhshan, 2017);
2depending on measurement and topic (Scharfbillig et al., 2026)
reinforces partisan (mis-)beliefs (Ecker et al., 2022)
secondary effects on uncertainty and distrust (Vaccari & Chadwick, 2020)
negative emotions and hate (Lühring et al., 2024)
artificial stimuli (also because deliberate exposure raises ethical concerns, Lazer et al., 2021)
science-friendly samples (e.g., Lühring et al., 2024)
cannot capture group- or platform-level interactions (Bak-Coleman et al., 2025)
\(\rightarrow\) study effects of misinformation where it spreads
1=based on circumplex model (Russell, 1980) and
constructivist view (Leach & Bou Zeineddine, 2021; Lindquist & Barrett, 2012)
overlaps with moral outrage and hate speech (McLoughlin et al., 2024; Mosleh et al., 2024) \(\rightarrow\) collective emotions1 (Goldenberg et al., 2020)
gets engagement (Juul & Ugander, 2021; Vosoughi et al., 2018)
confounded by other source cues, hateful and sensationalist language, …
\(\rightarrow\) calls to rethink causality and estimate effects in the wild (Budak et al., 2024; Lorenz-Spreen et al., 2022; Tay et al., 2024)
keeps the naturalistic context of platform data
builds a synthetic control group comparable on observed confounders \(\rightarrow\) blocks backdoor paths (Ho et al., 2007; Pearl & Mackenzie, 2019)
Figure 7. Directed Acylic Graph (DAG) with matched; treatment; outcome.
keeps the naturalistic context of platform data
builds a synthetic control group comparable on observed confounders \(\rightarrow\) blocks backdoor paths (Ho et al., 2007; Pearl & Mackenzie, 2019)
evaluate performance based on differences
\(\uparrow\) more retweets for tweets with untrustworthy news sources
\(\downarrow\) but fewer likes & replies
\(\uparrow\) more anger, disgust and fear
\(\downarrow\) and less joy in response to untrustworthy sources
\(\rightarrow\) angrier users preferentially engage, creating self-reinforcement
Figure 12. Directed Acylic Graph (DAG) with matched; dashed = unobserved; who replies = part of the effect, not matched.
Sources with lower trustworthiness have lower reach overall \(\rightarrow\) misinformation is a contained problem (Allen et al., 2020)
Sources with low trustworthiness predict anger, disgust and fear expressions in following discussions (McLoughlin et al., 2024; Mosleh et al., 2024)
Limitations:
- Source \(\neq\) claim: we estimate effects of source trustworthiness, not of false claims in single posts as well as excluding non-textual content (Nenno et al., 2026);
- Unobserved confounders: topic, timing, algorithmic exposure \(\rightarrow\) tweet-level topics, causal sensitivity analyses, debiasing;
- Missing data: deleted tweets and suspended accounts
Email: jula.luehring@gesis.org
Bluesky: @julaluehring.bsky.social
Website: julaluehring.github.io
Luehring et al. — DGPuK Methodentagung 2026